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MORE THAN SEALS AND SEA OTTERS: OPA 
CAUSATION AND MORATORIUM DAMAGES 
ALLAN KANNER∗ 
ABSTRACT  
Following the 2010 BP/Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Federal 
Government issued a drilling and permitting moratorium in the Gulf of 
Mexico that resulted in significant economic losses for many businesses 
that serve the oil and gas industry. The Oil Pollution Act should have 
covered these economic damages; however, the Eastern District of 
Louisiana held otherwise. This article details how the Oil Pollution Act 
should have been applied to those who suffered economic loss as a result 
of the oil spill following the six month moratorium in the Gulf. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling 
unit suffered from a catastrophic blowout, explosion, and subsequent 
fire, which killed 11 people and injured at least 17 in the Gulf of 
Mexico.1 Two days later, on April 22, the Deepwater Horizon capsized 
and sank, collapsing the marine riser (a pipe connecting the drilling 
unit to the well), which then fractured.2 By the time the well was capped 
on July 15, 2010, almost three months after the initial incident, nearly 
four million barrels of oil had escaped the damaged wellhead and 3.19 
million barrels3 had reached Gulf waters.4 The incident was declared a 
“Spill of National Significance” under the National Contingency Plan 
on April 29, 2010.5 On April 30, President Obama ordered Secretary of 
the Interior Ken Salazar to review the blowout, fire, and sinking of the 
 
Copyright © 2017 Allan Kanner. 
∗ Partner, Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA; B.A., U. of Pennsylvania, 1975; J.D., 
Harvard Law School, 1979. 
 1. In re “ Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908, 909 (E.D. La. 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 910 (stating that 810,000 barrels were collected at the wellhead and did not enter 
the marine environment).  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. (quoting Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2013)).   
Kanner - Macros (Do Not Delete) 2/15/2018  5:31 PM 
32 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:31 
Deepwater Horizon and to report “what, if any, additional precautions 
and technologies should be required to improve the safety of oil and 
gas exploration and production operations on the outer continental 
shelf.”6 Secretary Salazar issued his findings on May 6, 2010, stating, 
“as a result of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill . . . no 
applications for drilling permits [would] go forward for any new 
offshore drilling activity.”7 The Secretary’s report ultimately 
recommended a six month moratorium on all drilling activity, either 
present or pending, in the Gulf of Mexico.8 
In its simplest form, a moratorium is “a ‘suspension of activity.’”9 
For example, if a road is closed, the ramifications of such a closure 
could qualify as a moratorium on driving. In the case of the Deepwater 
Horizon, the moratorium consisted of a few phases. Immediately 
following the blowout, the Coast Guard and NOAA closed fishing 
sites,10 altered and closed navigation and aviation areas, and instructed 
people to avoid the disaster area.11 The Coast Guard’s preventative 
measures continued until May 2011.12 As such, each phase of the 
moratorium following the Deepwater Horizon disaster requires a fact-
intensive inquiry into causation and damages.13 Two of these inquiries 
at issue in the B1 bundle14 litigation were the moratorium and the 
 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Moratorium, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/moratorium (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).  
 10. Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Area Closures 
Due to BP Oil Spill, 
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon/size_percent_closure/index.html (last visited Nov. 
10, 2017).  
 11. Oil and Chemical Spills, HTTPS://OCEANSERVICE.NOAA.GOV/HAZARDS/SPILLS/ (LAST 
VISITED NOV. 10, 2017). 
 12. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to BP’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, 
Addendum B at 9, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (No. 15704). 
 13. The plaintiffs, defendants, and the court agreed that this inquiry would be extremely fact 
intensive. In his opinion dismissing BP’s motion for summary judgement on the B1 Bundle claims, 
Judge Barbier noted: “The parties acknowledge that these claims are fact specific and present a 
more attenuated causation analysis than the other claims for economic loss, and they compare and 
contrast the instant Moratorium claims and VoO claims with the facts in the few cases that have 
been decided” and later “[t]he Court need not define causation under OPA—necessarily a highly 
factual analysis—at this stage of the pleadings. The Court is satisfied that the VoO and 
Moratorium Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims in the B1 bundle.” In 
re “Deepwater Horizon”, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 965–66 (E.D. La. 2011) (emphasis added). Despite 
this agreement, the court’s ruling dismissing the moratorium claims did not contain a factual 
analysis regarding the specifics of these claims and even stated that it would not delve into the 
causation argument. See generally In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 908.  
 14. Given the vast quantity of claims, the MDL was organized into pleading bundles based 
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permitoria, which was the original halt in and subsequent slowdown of 
permitting by the Mineral Management Service (MMS).15 This article 
deals conceptually with both but for the sake of simplicity, references 
the case generally as the “Moratorium.” 
The Moratorium was the subject of multiple legal cases as affected 
companies attempted to recoup lost profits.16 Concerned by the lost 
time and profits, several companies filed suit alleging that the 
Moratorium violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
because it was arbitrary and capricious.17 Judge Feldman of the Eastern 
District of Louisiana agreed and issued an injunction blocking the 
Moratorium on June 22, 2010.18 Secretary Salazar then rescinded the 
original Moratorium and reissued an amended version on July 12, 2010, 
which included a more detailed account of his reasoning.19 On 
September 29, 2010, the Fifth Circuit held that the reissued 
Moratorium mooted the original injunction, allowing the terms of the 
July Moratorium to proceed.20 Finally, on October 12, 2010, the 
Moratorium was lifted.21 
Despite the fact that the Moratorium was not maintained for the 
entire six month period, many companies—both drilling companies 
and those that serve them—suffered lost profits as the permitting 
process was halted and then delayed, sometimes up to a year, until the 
MMS began processing applications again.22 These companies sued as 
part of the BP/Deepwater Horizon Multidistrict Litigation (MDL). 
They were members of the B1 pleading bundle, which contained “all 
claims for private or non-governmental economic loss and property 
damages.”23 On March 10, 2016, Judge Barbier of the Eastern District 
 
on their nature. The B1 bundle dealt with non-governmental private and business loss claims, 
including economic losses. Case Management Order No. 1, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. 
Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ 
091410BPplaintiffsmotion.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2017)’.  
 15. Which was reorganized as of October 2011 and is now known as the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEM).  
 16. The lead author was counsel for the State of Louisiana in the Moratorium litigation 
before Judge Feldman and OPA litigation before Judge Barbier. See, e.g., In the News, 
KANNER&WHITELEY (June 10, 2010) https://www.kanner-law.com/kw-hired-to-represent-
louisiana-against-bp/. 
 17. Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 636 (E.D. La. 2010).   
 18. Id. at 639. 
 19. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908, 911 (E.D. La. 2016). 
 20. Hornbeck, 713 F.3d at 791. 
 21. “Deepwater Horizon,” 168 F. Supp. 3d at 911. 
 22. Id.  
 23. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D. La. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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of Louisiana held that the Moratorium losses did not fall within the 
scope of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), and as such, that these 
companies could not recover.24 I respectfully disagree with the court 
and believe that such a reading is overly narrow and contrary to the 
purpose and design of OPA. 
Though the court did not specifically address the causation 
standard under OPA, it did so implicitly by analyzing the wording of 
the statute and excluding economic damages arising from the 
Moratorium.25 In fact, it stated that “[t]he Court makes clear that it 
need not and does not decide whether or not § 2702(a) and/or § 
2702(b)(2)(E) incorporates a proximate causation standard, etc.”26 
Despite that statement, the court included a two-step proximate 
causation standard in its analysis. OPA is a strict liability statute 
designed to restore property and natural resources to pre-incident 
baselines and to compensate public and private parties for losses that 
they incurred, whether they involve actual property damage or purely 
economic damages.27 The sections at issue read as follows: 
A. § 2702(a): 
[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is 
discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, 
into or upon the navigable waters … is liable for the removal costs and 
damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that results from 
such incident. 
B. § 2702(b)(2)(E): 
Profits and earning capacity – Damages equal to the loss of profits 
or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss 
of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall 
be recoverable by any claimant.28 
As discussed herein, the court incorrectly interpreted the “result 
from” and “due to” language when deciding whether or not the 
Moratorium stemmed from the Deepwater Horizon spill. It also relied 
 
 24. The OPA issue was litigated and lost by counsel for the private parties to the MDL. At 
that point, the states and federal government, whose claims were proceeding as part of a separate 
Bundle, had settled their claims with BP and thus did not litigate this issue with respect to their 
claims.  
 25. Id. at 915–16. 
 26. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 918.   
 27. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
 28. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a), (b)(2)(E) (2012). 
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on a Fifth Circuit case, In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5,29 which, 
although it involved claims brought under OPA, was not a true OPA 
case as it did not involve an oil spill.30 If OPA is read in the manner 
Congress intended, Moratorium claims should be recoverable as they 
fall within the class of damages contemplated by § 2702(b)(2)(E) and 
are consistent with Congress’ broad purpose of deterring oil spills by 
the specter of strict liability for virtually unlimited damages. 
There can be little doubt that a temporary moratorium would 
result from the worst oil spill in history. This point is noted in BP’s own 
pre-accident risk assessment documents, which stated that a 
catastrophic disaster would jeopardize all drilling activities and likely 
merit legislative change.31 Regardless of BP’s analysis, foreseeability is 
not a requirement of a strict liability statute.32 OPA, premised on the 
principle that the polluter pays, is designed to hold all polluters strictly 
liable for pollution events.33 There are three limited exceptions to this 
rule,34 none of which includes foreseeability, superseding cause, or the 
 
 29. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 915–17. 
 30. Id. at 917. 
 31. In BP’s 2009 Major Hazard Risks Placed on Risk Register report, it recognizes 
consequences of various levels of disasters that include health and safety, environmental impacts, 
and reputational impacts, which include effects to international, national, and regional legislation. 
Suttles Deposition at 361, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (No. 
51911). So even if BP’s “superseding cause” arguments were acceptable under OPA, it still 
recognizes that the type of legislative change that the Moratorium catalyzed is a direct result of 
its own actions. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to BP’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, 
“Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (No. 15704–06). 
 32. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act: Current Law and 
Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 930 (2011) (stating that under the strict liability imposed 
by OPA defendants can assert only a few narrow defenses, which do not include lack of 
foreseeability). 
 33. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operative Development (OECD) defines the 
“Polluter Pays Principle.” It states that “[t]he principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution 
prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and 
to avoid distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called ‘Polluter-Pays 
Principle.’ This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the 
above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an 
acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of 
goods and services that cause pollution in production and/or consumption. Such measures should 
not be accompanied by subsidies that would create significant distortions in international trade 
and investment.” John Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution 
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays Principle,” 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 468–70 (2000) 
(quoting OECD, Environment and Economics: Guiding Principles Concerning International 
Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, May 26, 1972, annex para. 1, Doc. No. 
C(72)128, 1972 WL 24710). OPA has adopted this through its strict liability regime designed to 
make the responsible party rather than the public pay to clean up oil spills and reimburse costs of 
the government and private parties that were harmed by the spill.  
 34. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). These exceptions include an act of god, an act of war, or an 
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assignment of partial blame to another party (the three exceptions set 
forth by BP).35  OPA’s construction as a strict liability statute, its 
polluter pays policy, and limited liability exceptions all indicate that its 
causation standard is as unique as the oil spills that it is designed to 
address.  
The causation standard has been a point of contention among 
courts interpreting OPA since its adoption in 1990. Because OPA does 
not use traditional common law terms in its liability provisions, courts 
have had difficulty interpreting the phrases “result from” and “due to” 
without applying traditional maritime and common law structures.36 
Despite the desire to conform to traditional notions of tort law, it is 
important to read statutes in a manner consistent with Congressional 
intent. Generally, there is disagreement regarding whether or not 
Congress intended a proximate causation standard for evaluating OPA 
damage claims.37 While the proximate causation standard is used in 
OPA, it is contained in the section dedicated to limiting liability.38 
Section 2704(c)(1) states that limited liability can be excluded if it can 
be shown that “the incident was proximately caused by” gross 
negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the responsible party.39 
Legal canon holds that “[w]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”40 Thus, it follows 
that the liability provisions of OPA do not include a proximate cause 
standard. Using the Moratorium claims as an example, this article aims 
to parse the meaning of the phrases “result from” and “due to” in order 
to show that, although OPA’s causation standard likely lies somewhere 
between proximate cause and but-for causation, a but-for standard 
more closely aligns with OPA’s purpose. 
 
 
act or omission of a third party. The act of a third party does not include intervening or 
superseding causes.  
 35. Motion Requesting Discovery and Trial Setting on Certain of the State of Louisiana’s 
2010 Economic Loss Claims Under OPA, In re ““Deepwater Horizon, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. 
La. 2016) (No. 7744) (highlighting four of BP’s affirmative defenses noting superseding and 
intervening causes and proximate causation and therefore foreseeability arguments).  
 36. Jillian Talley, Issues Arising Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: The Causation 
Conundrum, 14 LOY. MARYMOUNT L.J. 148, 150 (2014). 
 37. Id. 
 38. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2012). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).  
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II. STATUTORY INTENT 
To understand OPA, it is necessary to examine what it replaced. 
Traditionally, oil spills, collisions between ships, collisions between 
ships and stationary objects, and any other incident arising on the 
navigable waters of the United States are considered cases of 
Admiralty belonging under the jurisdiction of federal maritime law. 
Until 1990, following the massive Exxon Valdez spill, marine oil 
pollution defendants found relief in federal maritime law. Two 
provisions in particular favor tortfeasors: the right to limit liability “to 
the value of the vessel . . . if the ship owner can show that damages 
sought by the victims came about ‘without the privity or knowledge of 
the [ship]owner’”41 and damages limited to those who could show 
actual physical damage (meaning no purely economic losses).42 The 
second rule is articulated in two prominent maritime cases: Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint (Robins), 275 U.S. 303 (1927),43 a Supreme 
Court case, and State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK 
(TESTBANK),44 a Fifth Circuit case. 
In Robins, third party contractors of a ship sued the Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Company for lost profits after the ship’s propeller was 
damaged while dry-docked.45 The third party contractors argued that 
because their contract with the ship’s owner specified that the ship be 
docked for repairs every six months, the contract between the ship’s 
owner and Robins was made for the third party’s benefit, and therefore 
it could recover its economic damages under the contract.46 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument “finding that a party to a 
contract who commits a tort cannot be held liable in damages to an 
unknown third person that has an interest in the damaged property of 
another person.”47 As such, the Supreme Court adopted the Robins 
Dry Dock rule (“Robins rule”): a bright line rule stipulating that there 
is no cause of action for purely economic damages without physical 
injury to a proprietary interest.48 
 
 
 41. David W. Robertson, The Oil Pollution Act’s Provisions on Damages for Economic Loss, 
30 MISS. C. L. REV. 157, 166 (2011) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) (2006)).   
 42. Id. 
 43. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).  
 44. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 45. Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. 303 at 307. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Talley, supra note 36, at 152. 
 48. Id. 
Kanner - Macros (Do Not Delete) 2/15/2018  5:31 PM 
38 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:31 
Then, in 1985, a bulk carrier and a container ship collided in the 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), causing a chemical spill.49 As 
such, the MRGO had to be closed, resulting in economic losses to many 
claimants, including those with shipping interests and fishermen who 
were unable to access or utilize the MRGO for the duration of the two 
week closure.50 In State of Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 
the District Court upheld the Robins rule as it applied to those with 
shipping interests but expanded the scope of recovery to include the 
fishermen that were unable to access fish.51 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
expanded the Robins rule by allowing commercial fishermen to recover 
purely economic damages; the court noted that Union Oil Co. v. 
Oppen52-which the plaintiffs cited as abolishing the Robins rule-
actually “pointed out that the fishermen’s losses were foreseeable and 
direct consequences of the spill,” which creates a limited exception to 
the rule.53 In fact, the Union Oil court expressly declined to “open the 
door to claims that may be asserted by…other[s]…whose economic or 
personal affairs were discommoded by the oil spill.”54 As such, the 
TESTBANK rule merely expanded the Robins rule to include 
commercial fishermen. All other would-be plaintiffs would still need to 
prove physical damage to a proprietary interest in order to recover 
economic damages. 
These two rules were applicable when the Exxon Valdez ran 
aground in Prince William Sound off the coast of Alaska on March 24, 
1989. There, just as in all previous oil spill cases, Robins, M/V 
TESTBANK, and federal maritime law limited recovery only to those 
who could prove physical damage and to commercial fishermen. As 
such, countless individuals, business, and communities could not 
recover for their losses.55 Congress had attempted for years to reform 
oil spill liability, and the Exxon Valdez spill provided the best impetus 
for new legislation.56 Many Congressmen lamented that “poor people 
in Alaska . . . have lost their jobs, their livelihood, their homes, and the 
beautiful area in which they live.”57 As such, when Congress drafted 
 
 49. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d at 1020. 
 50. Id. at 1020–21. 
 51. Id. at 1021. 
 52. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 53. Id. at 1026.  The court also noted “that fishermen have historically enjoyed a protected 
position under maritime law” Id. 
 54. Id. at 1023 (quoting Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 at 570–71 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 55. Talley, supra note 36, at 158. 
 56. Robertson, supra note 41, at 158. 
 57. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S9921 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).  
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OPA, it sought to ensure that such devastation would never happen 
again by removing many hurdles found in typical litigation, thereby 
allowing victims to receive fair compensation promptly.58 One Senate 
report noted, “[t]hese provisions are intended to provide 
compensation for a wide range of injuries and are not so narrowly 
focused as to prevent victims of an oil spill from receiving reasonable 
compensation.”59  Congress stated repeatedly that OPA would cover 
more victims to ensure speedy economic recovery for all those 
affected.60 
Knowing that Congress intended OPA to extend recovery to more 
than those affected physically and directly by an oil spill implicates the 
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation: “[i]n interpreting a statute a 
court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. 
We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what 
it says there.“61 
This rule should guide all interpretation of OPA’s causation 
standard because standards restricting recovery in clear contravention 
of Congressional intent should not be read into the statute.62 To 
reiterate, OPA’s liability standard reads as follows: 
A. § 2702(a): 
[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is 
discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, 
into or upon the navigable waters…is liable for the removal costs and 
damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that results from 
such incident. 
 
 58. Robertson, supra note 41, at 159. 
 59. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 12 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 734. 
 60. In a footnote, Robertson highlights several quotes from congressional reports: 135 
CONG. REC. H7955 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989) (statement of Rep. Quillen) (stating that “full, fair, 
and swift compensation for everyone injured by oil spills”; stating that “residents of States will be 
fully compensated for all economic damages”); 136 CONG. REC. H336 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) 
(statement of Rep. Carper) (arguing to “ensure that those people or those businesses that are 
damaged by these spills are fairly and adequately compensated”). Robertson, supra note 41, at 
175, n.58.  
 61. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 62. The risk of judicial rewriting of statutes occurs in many contexts. See generally Allan 
Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645 
(2006) (arguing for plain reading of the statute Congress passed).  
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B. § 2702(b)(2)(E): 
Profits and earning capacity – Damages equal to the loss of profits 
or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss 
of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall 
be recoverable by any claimant.63 
The emphasized phrases are those that give courts pause when 
determining the proper causation standard in OPA cases. None of the 
above falls neatly within traditional maritime or tort causation 
standards and, as such, there is much argument about the extent to 
which they adhere to traditional liability standards and how far they 
deviate from the same. 
First, it is prudent to highlight what Congress has said regarding 
the “result from” and “due to” language found respectively in § 2702(a) 
and § 2702(b)(2)(E): “Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant 
may recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity 
resulting from [the statutory term is “due to”] injury to property or 
natural resources.”64 Professor Robertson points out that this is “an 
authoritative indication by Congress that the Section 2702(b)(2)(E) 
term ‘due to’ has the same meaning as the Section 2702(a) term ‘result 
from.’”65 Congress’ concise statement on the matter unequivocally 
contradicts the argument that the “due to” standard places an 
additional causation burden on those claiming purely economic 
damages.66 
 
 63. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)–(b)(2)(E) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 103 (1990).  
 65. Robertson, supra note 41, at 168.  
 66. Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, Kenneth Feinberg was placed at the helm of 
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, the purpose of which was to settle claims for economic losses 
against BP. Feinberg requested that Professor John C.P. Goldberg of Harvard write a memo 
discussing the meaning of § 2702(b)(2)(E) so that Feinberg will be able to discern which claims 
fall under the scope of OPA and which do not. Notably, Feinberg was not independent of BP and 
as such some believe was seeking to limit as many claims as possible. Professor Goldberg posited 
that this particular section added a commercial use right requirement as the “due to” added 
another layer of proof. The professor states that “[t]his statutory language is best understood to 
allow recovery only by those economic loss claimants who can prove that they have suffered 
economic loss because a spill has damaged, destroyed, or otherwise rendered physically 
unavailable to them property or resources that they have a right to put to commercial use.” Id. at 
164 (quoting John C. P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater 
Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 335, 337 (2010). In other words, Professor Goldberg incorrectly 
contends that Congress did not in fact expand recovery past what M/V TESTBANK allowed. See 
generally Louisiana v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)). Under such a proposition 
claimants would have to show that the natural resource was injured, that they suffered economic 
loss, and that they would have been able to put that natural resource to commercial use, such as 
through fishing.   
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Since Congress intended the “due to” and “result from” language 
to be synonymous, it is important to reemphasize that “[w]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.”67 Many responsible parties have attempted to 
interpret § 2702(b)(2)(E) as somehow including a proximate cause, use 
right, or similarly restrictive standard. Upon a proper reading, such 
restrictions do not exist because the “due to” language found in section 
(E) is intended to mirror the “result from” language of § 2702(a).68 In 
order to understand these distinctions, § 2702(b) provides a list of the 
classes of claimants and the prerequisites for each to recover.69 
Importantly, § 2702(b)(2)(C) includes a use standard that directly 
addresses the use of natural resource for subsistence while section (E) 
does not. Section 2702(b)(2)(C) directly addresses those that use 
natural resources for subsistence use.70 Damages are recoverable by 
“any claimant who so uses natural resources which have been injured, 
destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of 
the resources.”71 The mere existence of this section refutes Professor 
Goldberg’s contention that section (E) is only intended for those who 
use the injured natural resource for economic gain, such as commercial 
fishermen.72 Further, this section requires a claimant to show that the 
natural resource has been damaged, whereas in section (E) the 
claimants’ losses need only be due to (i.e. result from) the injury.73 If 
the proper statutory interpretation canon is applied, Congress’ 
decision to leave such a use-right out of section (E) indicates that they 
intended for the section to cover more claimants than just those who 
subsist off natural resources. Congress would not have included (E) as 
superfluous language if it had meant for it to follow the same standard 
 
 67. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).  
 68. See M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 note 44. 
 69. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A)–(F) (2012).  
 70. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (2012). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Professor Goldberg concludes in his memo that proper interpretation of § 2702(b)(2)(E) 
holds that “if a spill were to deprive commercial fishermen of expected profits by killing fish they 
ordinarily would catch and sell, or by causing authorities to bar the fishermen from accessing 
those fish for a period of time, the fishermen would be entitled to recover. By contrast, operators 
of beach resorts in areas physically unaffected by a spill, but that nonetheless suffer economic loss 
because of a general downturn in tourism resulting from the spill, are among those who are not 
entitled to recovery under OPA.”  
 73. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E). 
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set forth in (C).74 While such a use-right standard should not be read 
into the statute, it is highly important that the words in the statute are 
given their proper statutory meaning and context. 
Much of the responsible parties’ apparent confusion comes from 
their failure to read § 2702(a) completely. It states that a responsible 
party is liable for injuries that “result from such incident.”75 It is 
imperative that the proper emphasis is placed on the “incident” itself, 
rather than on the discharge of oil. In the BP litigation, Transocean 
argued that “incident” in § 2702(a) is synonymous with “the discharge 
or threatened discharge of oil,”76 when in fact the statute defines 
“incident” as “any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same 
origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination 
thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of 
oil”.”77 This means that the events leading up to the discharge of oil, 
rather than the discharge itself, constitute the incident. For example, 
damages from governmental decisions to halt fishing would constitute 
part of the incident and not the risk of contact between the fish and oil.  
Liability attaches to the incident under § 2702(a), which holds that the 
responsible party is “liable for the removal costs and damages specified 
in subsection (b) of this section that result from such incident.”78 As 
such, the economic damages, including the Moratorium losses that fall 
under § 2702(b)(2)(E), would simply have to arise from the incident. 
Since claimants need not show a use-right and the “due to” language is 
equivalent to the “result from” language, claimants under section (E) 
need only show that their injuries resulted from the incident that 
caused injury or destruction to personal property or natural 
resources.79  
Some sections, however, do require that a certain class of 
claimant’s injuries be caused directly by the discharge of oil. Notably, 
§ 2702(b)(2)(F) requires that the specified damages be “caused by a 
discharge of oil,” which is conspicuously absent in section (E).80 It is 
 
 74. See Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (2014) (reaffirming the rule against 
superfluity and holding that an interpretation of a statute that avoids superfluous language is 
“more faithful to the statute Congress wrote”). 
 75. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (emphasis added). 
 76.  Transocean’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the State of Louisiana’s First Amended 
Complaint at 32, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F.Supp.3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (No. 2656-1).   
 77. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14) (2012).  
 78. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (emphasis added). 
 79. 33 U.S.C. at § 2702(b)(2)(B). Importantly, plaintiffs do not need to own the injured 
property or natural resources as those claims are covered in § 2702(b)(2)(B). 
 80. 33 U.S.C. at § 2702(b)(2)(F). 
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logical for section (F) to contain such a requirement because it pertains 
to increased public services to protect the public from safety hazards 
(i.e. an oil spill).81 Once again, Congress would have included “caused 
by” language if it wished to limit economic damages to those directly 
impacted by the discharge of oil rather than the incident. “Caused by” 
language often has a proximate causation connotation, which, once 
again, is not included in § 2702(b)(2)(E). 
As noted previously, Congress did in fact include proximate cause 
language in other parts of the statute. For example, § 2704 details the 
limits on responsible party liability. Responsible parties are generally 
not subject to unlimited liability unless it is shown that the incident was 
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct.82 Importantly, the 
standard for proving such gross negligence or willful misconduct is 
proximate causation.83 Section 2704 (c) states: “Subsection (a) [limits 
on liability] of this section does not apply if the incident was 
proximately caused by …”84 This is yet another example of Congress 
using language in one section and omitting it in another, which 
illustrates its intent to apply a different standard.85 Further supporting 
the fact that it did not intend for the liability section to follow such a 
standard, it was included in OPA’s predecessor legislation, as well as 
early iterations of the statute, but left out in the final adopted version.   
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) preceded OPA 
as a remedial statute for oil spills.86 The adoption of OPA repealed 
much of this legislation, including the portions containing a proximate 
causation standard. Title III of the OSCLA Amendments of 1978 
provided for the recovery of damages that were “proximately caused 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. 33 U.S.C. at § 2704(c)(1)(A) (2012).  
 83. See id. (stating that § 2704(a) does not apply if the incident was proximately caused by 
gross negligence or willful misconduct). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Contrary to this clear intention, BP asserted that “When Federal statutes do not define 
a causation rule with specificity, the default rule is the familiar proximate cause standard,” citing 
recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Copyright Act and OSCLA. BPXP’s 
Memorandum in Opposition to the OPA Test Case Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Affirmative 
Defenses and Motion In Limine Regarding Potential Third-Party Fault at 29, In re ““Deepwater 
Horizon, 168 F.Supp.3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (No. 13269). Because it was not the standard with 
which it is most familiar, it reads proximate cause into OPA under the guise of convoluted 
congressional intent. It stated “[i]t also bears emphasis that courts presume that Congress 
legislates with knowledge of the interpretive backdrop against which their laws will be construed.” 
Essentially BP is of the opinion that despite what Congress may have to say on the matter, it 
clearly never intended to change the causation status based on the (notably unarticulated) 
assumption that it is familiar with case law.  
 86. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a)–(q) (2012).  
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by the discharge of oil from an offshore facility or vessel.”87 OPA 
replaced this provision with 2702(a).88 Because Congress intended to 
eliminate the proximate cause requirement, such a standard should not 
be read into OPA’s liability provision. Furthermore, Title III of the 
OSCLA Amendments of 1978 contained a use-right provision that was 
similarly left out of OPA.89 It authorized the recovery of pollution-
caused economic damages “due to injury to, or destruction of, real or 
personal property or natural resources…if the claimant derives at least 
25 per centum of his earnings from activities which utilize the property 
or natural resource.”90 OPA repealed and replaced this provision with 
§ 2702(b)(2)(E), which plainly does not contain such a use-right 
restriction.91 Finally, and fatally for any argument that Congress 
intended for a proximate cause or use right standard to be read into 
OPA, the first drafts of OPA did contain such provisions, but these 
provisions were removed before the Act was adopted in 1990.92 
Proximate cause and use rights were in the first iterations of OPA 
but were removed prior to its final adoption.93 Early versions of the Act 
included both a direct causation standard as well as a proximate cause 
standard.94 One version sought to limit recoverable damages to those 
“which are proximately cause[d] by”95 the spill or threat of spill, while 
others attempted to limit damages to those “that arise out of or directly 
result from”96 a spill or threat of a spill, or those “that arise out of or 
directly result from such discharge or threat of discharge.”97 As to the 
use-right, three of the preliminary bills introduced in Congress 
included such a limitation in their economic loss sections.98 However, 
as the bills made their way through the legislative process, that 
language was deleted.99 Such inclusion and subsequent deletions are 
not inconsequential. The second statutory interpretation cannon 
 
 87. Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 301(15), 92 Stat. 629 (1986). 
 88. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 2004 (1990).  
 89. See Robertson, supra note 41, at 186 (citing Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978)).  
 90. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629, § 303(a)(2)(E)–(b)(4)). 
 91. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012).  
 92. Robertson, supra note 41, at 187.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. H.R. 3027, 101st Cong. § 102(a)(1) (1st Sess. 1989). 
 96. H.R. 1465, 101st Cong. § 102(a) (1st Sess. 1989). 
 97. H.R. 2325, 101st Cong. § 102(a) (1st Sess. 1989). 
 98. Id. at § 102(a)(3)(D); H.R. 1465, 101st Cong. § 102(a)(2)(B)(v) (1st Sess. 1989); H.R. 
3027, 101st Cong. § 102(a)(2)(B) (1st Sess. 1989).  
 99. Robertson, supra note 41, at 187.  
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expounded in Russello holds: “Where Congress includes limiting 
language in an earlier version of the bill but deletes it prior to 
enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended”.100 
As such, it is improper to read any sort of use-right, proximate 
causation standard, or any similarly restrictive standard into § 
2702(b)(2)(E). 
III. OPA USES A NEXUS STANDARD 
Since Congress did not intend for either a use-right or proximate 
cause standard to be read into the “result from” and “due to” language 
found in OPA’s liability section, it is important to clarify what was 
actually intended. The standard articulated in § 2702(b)(2)(E) requires 
only that a nexus be shown between a spill and resulting damage.101 If 
we are to give meaning to the statute, as the Supreme Court has 
recommended, by “presum[ing] that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there,”102 we should look 
first to the basic meaning of “result from.”  The plain English meaning 
of “result” means “to proceed or arise as a consequence, effect, or 
conclusion” and “from” “indicate[s] the source, cause, agent or 
basis.”103 Stated another way, “result from” means the cause without 
which the event would not have occurred, i.e. “but for,” which means 
that responsible parties are liable for damages and removal costs that 
would not have accrued “but for” the incident. Such an interpretation 
is congruent with Congress’ intention to expand the classes of 
claimants that can recover following an oil spill. When read with this 
broad nexus standard, OPA clearly allows for the recovery of 
Moratorium damages. Case law supports such a broad interpretation, 
and those cases that read the statute narrowly were decided contrary 
to clearly expressed Congressional intent. 
 
 
 
 
 100. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983). 
 101. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012) (stating that applicable damages are equal to the 
loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real 
property, personal property, or natural resources). 
 102. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).  
 103. E.g., Result, MERRIAM-WEBSTER. COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
result?show=0&t=1302396398 (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (defining result as “to proceed or arise 
as a consequence, effect, or conclusion”). 
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IV. OPA HAS A NUMBER OF FEATURES THAT FORECLOSE A 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION STANDARD 
Strict joint and several liability framed with narrow defenses, set 
liability caps, and a polluter pays policy, indicate that Congress did not 
intend for the liability provisions of OPA to include a proximate 
causation standard. Such a structure renders proximate causation 
untenable in OPA’s liability provisions. 
Strict joint and several liability prevents a responsible party from 
forcing the plaintiff to apportion the damage between all responsible 
parties. According to E. Donald Elliot and Mary Beth Houlihan, this 
feature is imperative for swift delivery of compensation. They note the 
following: 
The idea was that ‘finger-pointing’ among the companies involved 
should not delay either the clean-up or paying compensation to the 
injured. Thus, the term ‘responsible party’ is really a misnomer; a more 
accurate term might be the ‘initially responsible party,’ because a party 
paying claims in the first instance under OPA90 may seek to hold 
others ultimately responsible.104 
Those found to be responsible parties may attempt to place the 
blame on another actor; however, the burden of proof is steep and 
those parties are unlikely to prevail. Stated another way, liability to 
victims is easily established, though a more contentious and time-
consuming contribution process may be available in appropriate cases. 
First, and importantly, OPA, despite numerous cross references to 
the CWA in its liability provisions,105 does not include the same 
government negligence defense as the CWA.106 As such, responsible 
parties are precluded from placing any type of blame on the United 
States government for its possible negligence. Furthermore, § 
2703(a)(3) provides for a defense to liability if the incident was caused 
by “an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent 
of the responsible party or a third party whose act or omission occurs 
in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsible 
 
 104. E. DONALD ELLIOT & MARY BETH HOULIHAN, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF OIL SPILLS 
(ALI-ABA Advanced Environmental Law Conference, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007604 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
 105. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (“Covered removal costs and damages . . . all removal costs 
incurred by the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (l) of 
section 1321 of this title.”). 
 106. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (2012) (“Except where an owner or operator can prove that a 
discharge was caused solely by . . . (C) negligence on the part of the United States Government.”).  
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party.”107 Such a defense may be invoked if the responsible party can 
show that it “exercised due care” and “took precautions against 
foreseeable acts or omissions.”108 The Act goes on to define a 
contractual relationship, and indicates joint and several liability, stating 
in § 2703(d)(6): “[n]othing in this paragraph shall affect the liability 
under this Act of a responsible party who, by any act or omission, 
caused or contributed to the discharge or substantial threat of 
discharge of oil which is the subject of the action relating to the 
facility.”109 
Further still, there is no reference to any failure to mitigate 
damages on the part of the plaintiff akin to a contributory negligence 
analysis.110 Should the responsible party attempt to make such an 
argument, it would be foreclosed per se by the strict, joint, and several 
liability imposed by the statute. Under OPA, once a plaintiff has 
established that an actor is a responsible party such an actor may be 
held liable for all of the damages, regardless of whether or not other 
parties are at fault.111  The burden of proof then shifts to the responsible 
party to seek contribution from other possible responsible parties or to 
prove the three affirmative defenses.112 
Congress only provided two other defenses to liability within 
OPA: an act of God or an act of war.113 Both of these extreme events 
added to the already-limited third party defense, making it difficult for 
a responsible party to evade liability. If a party is responsible in any 
way, these defenses will not apply.114 Such narrow defenses to liability 
indicate that Congress intended for polluters to be held liable in all but 
a very few instances. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation & Liability Act (“CERCLA”) has analogous 
exceptions to liability.115 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., the court 
noted that “[i]nterpreting section 9607(a)(1) as including a causation 
 
 107. 33 U.S.C. §2703(a)(3) (2012). 
 108. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(A)–(B).   
 109. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(d)(6).  
 110. E.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3, cmts. a–b, 
rep. notes (2017). 
 111. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012) (stating that “each responsible party for a vessel or a 
facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, 
into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is 
liable”) (emphasis added). 
 112. 33 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012).  
 113. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1)–(2). 
 114. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 9707(b) (2012).  
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requirement makes superfluous the affirmative defenses provided in 
section 9607(b), each of which carves out from liability an exception 
based on causation.”116 Importantly, unlike CERCLA, “OPA 
exonerates the responsible party from liability imposed by [§ 2702] if 
that party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the incident 
resulted solely from (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or 
omission of a third party”… .”117 The addition of “solely” renders 
OPA’s exceptions even more restrictive than CERCLA. It follows then 
that the interpretation and construction of such exceptions are equal 
to or greater than those of CERCLA. Given these narrow causational 
exceptions, a proximate cause standard simply does not make sense in 
OPA section 2702(a). Because the proximate cause standard does not 
make sense within the context of OPA’s liability provisions, it would 
follow that any arguments and defenses that traditionally fall within 
such a causational analysis also fail to comport with OPA. 
One such analysis is that of intervening and superseding causes. 
Under traditional tort theory, if a potential tortfeasor can show that 
there is an intervening and superseding cause between the time of his 
action and the injury of the plaintiff, he will escape liability.118 This 
includes a foreseeability analysis that is conspicuously absent from 
OPA’s liability provisions. However, because OPA lists three very 
limited instances in which a responsible party may assert a complete 
defense, such arguments are inapplicable. The fact that proximate 
cause is included in other areas, but not in the liability section,119 means 
that the statute is based on strict joint and several liability. As such, 
even if the responsible party could point to some intervening fault of 
another actor, it would not absolve it of legal liability. If anything, the 
responsible party would be forced to seek contribution from the 
intervening actor.120 Finally, OPA did not include the governmental 
negligence exception found in the CWA.121 As such, under OPA, 
government actions, legal or not,122 cannot be used as a liability shield. 
 
 116. N.Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).  
 117. RUSSELL V. RANDLE, OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK, 2D (2012).  
 118. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 227 (2017).  
 119. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2012) (stating that subsection (a) does not apply if the 
incident was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct), with 33 U.S.C. § 
2702(a), (b) (2012) (excluding proximate causation).  
 120. 33 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). 
 121. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)(C) (2012).  
 122. In the Moratorium case, the plaintiffs noted that BP attempted “to claim that the 
Moratoria, or permitting changes, or other Governmental action was ‘unforeseeable’ or 
‘unreasonable’ or even ‘illegal’, thereby breaking the chain of causation as a ‘superseding cause 
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Arguably, the most important feature of OPA is its polluter pays 
policy. This policy is the driver behind strict, joint, and several liability 
and the limited defenses available to responsible parties.123 The 
“polluter pays” principle is based on the simple idea that the polluter, 
not the public, should internalize the cost of its damage to the 
environment.124 In European countries, this policy is implemented 
through proactive taxes on emissions, maintains the permitting 
systems, and responds to environmental disasters.125 In the United 
States, the polluter pays principle is found in CERCLA,126 the CWA,127 
and  OPA128 and forces the polluter to pay for removal and restoration 
costs in the event of a spill. It is evident in CWA’s criminal penalties 
where “‘It doesn’t require much’ to prove a criminal offense after an 
oil spill. ‘It’s basically: did BP intend to drill an oil well in the Gulf that 
resulted in a discharge of oil into waters of the United States?’”129 
OPA’s strict, joint, and several liability provides the same backstop: the 
responsible party is held liable for the pollution unless it can satisfy any 
of the three narrow exceptions.130 Congress recognized how financially 
debilitating strict liability can be and included a limit to liability in § 
2704.131 Taken together, it is clear that Congress intended for the 
polluter to pay. Such intention manifested itself in the language, 
liability structures, and defenses it selected. 
 
 
 
 
of Plaintiffs’ loss.” Class Counsel’s Reply Brief in Further Support of Motion to Strike 
Affirmative Defenses and Motion In Limine Regarding Potential Third-Party Fault and 
Superseding Cause Defense, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) 
(No. 13302). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Nash, supra note 33.  
 125. See, e.g., Coralie Noel, Capacity Building for Better Water Management, INT’L OFFICE 
FOR WATER 11–12 (2009), http://www.oieau.org/IMG/pdf/IOWater-
WaterManagementFrance.pdf.   
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 9707 (2012). 
 127. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012).  
 128. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). 
 129. E. DONALD ELLIOT & MARY BETH HOULIHAN, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF OIL SPILLS 
(ALI-ABA Advanced Environmental Law Conference, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007604 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2017).  
 130. Robert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua S. Force, Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, 
Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 
891 (2011).  
 131. Id.  
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V. CASE LAW SUPPORTS A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF OPA’S 
LIABILITY PROVISION 
There are several cases in which courts have read OPA’s liability 
provision broadly, as was intended by Congress. The other cases that 
failed to read the provisions broadly were wrongly decided because 
they ignored clear congressional intent. Furthermore, when compared 
with those that do read the statute broadly, the courts almost contradict 
one another. Both U.S. v. Conoco, Inc.132 and U.S. v. Hyundai Merchant 
Marine Co., Ltd.133 dealt with the recovery of Coast Guard monitoring 
costs and allowed for recovery despite the Coast Guard’s minimal 
involvement. By contrast, the court in Gatlin Oil Co. Inc. v. U.S.134 
adopted the Coast Guard’s narrow interpretation of the liability 
provisions, blocking Gatlin’s recovery from the Federal Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund (“Fund”) and, perhaps, created a loophole for 
would-be responsible parties. The statute cannot be read both broadly 
to favor the government and narrowly in response to a responsible 
party’s valid request for reimbursement. 
In U.S. v. Conoco, Inc., the Eastern District of Louisiana found 
that Conoco was liable for the monitoring costs incurred by the United 
States Coast Guard following two pipeline breaks and subsequent spills 
into the Gulf of Mexico.135 Although Conoco successfully removed all 
of the spilled oil, the Coast Guard undertook various monitoring 
activities to ensure intervention was not necessary.136 Such activities 
included helicopter flyovers, oversight of Conoco’s response efforts, 
and an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the 
incidents.137 The Coast Guard argued, and the court agreed as follows: 
“The government is authorized to monitor the cleanup efforts of 
the responsible party and OPA defines removal as including not only 
the actual containment or removal of oil but also such other actions as 
are necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or 
welfare.”138 
The government contended that Coast Guard monitoring was 
necessary in order to ensure that Conoco’s actions were sufficient to 
 
 132. 916 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. La. 1996).  
 133. 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 397 (1999). 
 134. 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 135. Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 581. 
 136. Id. at 582.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 583.  
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contain the spill, thereby minimizing and mitigating further damage.139 
Conoco, however, argued that reading monitoring activities into the 
definition of removal is beyond the scope of the definition and that had 
Congress intended such a meaning, it would have drafted the definition 
to read, “the taking of any other action as may be necessary to ensure 
minimization or mitigation of damages.”140 Instead, the definition as 
written only allows for recovery of those costs associated with the 
actual containment or removal of oil.141 The court disagreed. Judge 
Sear stated, “I view Conoco’s construction of § 2701(30) as too 
strained. Although the statute is not a model of clarity, the language is 
broad enough to comport with the government’s interpretation.”142 
Conoco further alleged that the government’s authorization to 
monitor cleanup activities, does not mean that the private party should 
be charged for the costs of such monitoring.143 Conoco read § 1321 (of 
the Clean Water Act as referenced in OPA §2702(b)(1)(A)) as only 
covering actual removal efforts.144 Once again, Judge Sear disagreed 
stating, “[t]his argument cannot withstand scrutiny of the OPA 
provisions as a whole, however, inasmuch as I accept the interpretation 
of ‘removal’ as encompassing actions beyond actual containment and 
cleanup.”145 Importantly, Judge Sear emphasized the “provisions as a 
whole” and a broad interpretation of what “removal” encompasses. 
From the outset, Judge Sear framed his interpretation broadly, quoting 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America: “In construing a statute, the 
court is ‘guided not by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
[must] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and 
policy.”146 Such a reading results in a broad interpretation that covers 
a wide variety of government response actions - the cost of which a 
responsible party will be liable for under OPA. 
Three years after Conoco, in U.S. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine 
Co., Ltd., the Ninth Circuit similarly held that the Coast Guard was 
entitled to recover monitoring costs, including Coast Guard salaries.147 
In 1991, the bulk carrier M/V Hyundai No. 12 ran aground in the 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 586. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 583 (quoting Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 110 (1990)). 
 147. United States. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Shumagin Islands off the coast of Alaska.148 Though there was only 
minor spillage in the form of a 2000-foot long sheen, the carrier had 
200,000 gallons of bunker oil in its bottom fuel tanks.149 This qualified 
as a threatened major oil spill to which the Coast Guard responded 
with monitoring operations while Hyundai worked to free the ship and 
clean up the sheen.150 The Coast Guard stood by for eleven days while 
Hyundai performed the actual oil containment and ship freeing.151 The 
U.S. sued under OPA and the District Court awarded it 
$1,702,553.51.152 Hyundai appealed several aspects of that award, the 
crux of its argument being that a responsible party that spends millions 
on a successful cleanup should not have to reimburse the government 
for duplicative and unnecessary work.153 
Like Conoco, Hyundai attempted to argue that monitoring costs 
do not constitute removal costs contemplated by the statute.154 Like 
Judge Sear, the Ninth Circuit read the relevant OPA provisions to 
include the removal costs enumerated in § 2702(b) as well as those 
cross-referenced in the CWA.155 The court highlighted the definitions 
of “removal costs,” “removal,” and “costs of removal.”156 “Removal 
costs” are defined as “the costs of removal that are incurred after a 
discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a 
substantial threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, 
or mitigate oil pollution from such incident,” which clearly notes that 
prevention measures are covered by the statute.157 Hyundai argued that 
the definition of “removal” prevents the government from collecting 
such costs because it references “actions as may be necessary,” which 
Hyundai argued required that government actions must be 
necessary.158 The court, however, noted that such a reading is taken out 
of context. “Removal” is defined as the following: 
[C]ontainment and removal of oil or a hazardous substance from 
water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary 
to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare, 
 
 148. Id. at 1188.  
 149. Id. at 1189. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1190. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(31) (2012).  
 158. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d at 1191.  
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including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and 
private property, shorelines, and beaches.159 
The court noted, “the words ‘as may be necessary’ do not purport 
to be a limitation on reimbursement.160 They are more naturally read 
as an acknowledgement of executive discretion in determining the 
steps a particular situation requires,” and, regardless, “removal costs,” 
not “removal,” was the applicable definition in this case.161 
Finally, Hyundai argued that the Coast Guard’s base costs, or 
those that it would have incurred (such as personnel salaries) whether 
or not it was responding to the Hyundai emergency, were not covered 
under OPA’s liability section.162 However, the court found that the 
Coast Guard’s base costs did in fact “result from” the incident.163 It 
explained that “[t]he fact that, if this near-disaster had not occurred, 
the personnel would have been paid to perform some other task does 
not alter the reality that the mishap did occur and the Coast Guard 
personnel were paid to monitor a potential spill.”164 The Ninth Circuit 
read OPA as covering all of the responses that “result from” the 
incident, in this case, the Hyundai No. 12 running aground. Like 
Conoco, the Court construed the statute broadly to cover actual 
response costs and those damages resulting from the underlying 
“incident” rather than from the oil spill.  
In stark contrast with both Conoco and Hyundai’s broad readings 
is Gatlin Oil Co. Inc. v. U.S.,165 where the Fourth Circuit limited the 
ability of the Gatlin Oil Company to recover costs from the Fund by 
narrowly construing the statute. Interestingly, Gatlin is the inverse of 
Conoco and Hyundai, with the private responsible party seeking to 
recover damages and costs and the Coast Guard denying most of such 
recovery. On March 13, 1994, a vandal opened fuel storage tanks that 
were located on Gatlin’s property in North Carolina, leading to the 
discharge of approximately 20,000-30,000 gallons of oil, some of which 
entered nearby drainage ditches and eventually a navigable river.166 
Vapors from the released oil ignited a fire that burned for several 
hours, destroying much of Gatlin’s property including a warehouse, 
 
 159. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(30) (emphasis added). 
 160. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d at 1191. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 1192. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. 169 F.3d 207, 214 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 166. Id. at 209. 
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bulk plant, inventory, loading dock, several vehicles, and consuming 
most of the discharged fuel.167 The court held that Gatlin, the State of 
North Carolina, and the Coast Guard took all of the appropriate 
response actions.168 
The Federal On-Scene Coordinator determined that 5,500 gallons 
of oil had reached the surrounding ditches and that 10 gallons had 
made their way through dikes into a nearby creek that flowed into the 
North Prong of the Bay River.169 Gatlin complied with all federal, and 
later, state clean up directives and, on July 29, 1994, the Federal On-
Scene Coordinator officially confirmed compliance.170 Gatlin was 
entitled to a complete defense given that a vandal released the oil.171 It 
was also entitled to recover removal costs and damages from the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund.172 Gatlin requested $850,000, while the Coast 
Guard maintained that it was only entitled to $6,959 for the 5,500 
gallons in the ditches and the 10 gallons that reached the North 
Prong.173 The district court agreed with Gatlin after reviewing the 
Coast Guard’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
the APA.174 It remanded the case and the government appealed.175 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the Coast Guard, limiting 
Gatlin’s recovery to the cleanup costs for the oil that had reached the 
ditches and navigable water.176 This holding is entirely too narrow and 
contrary to the proper reading and intent of the statute. 
One commenter noted that such a reading of the statute is, on the 
surface, “consistent with one of the stated purposes of OPA: increasing 
the financial responsibility of a polluting party.”177 Importantly, 
however, Gatlin was a victim as much as the environment and did 
everything in its power to correct the situation while experiencing 
significant loss itself. The court in Gatlin wrongly focused on a single 
word found within § 2702(a): “such.”178 By referring to the discharge of 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 210. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Brian Theodore Holmen, Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States: A Myopic View of OPA 
Liability, 42 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1893, 1894 (2001).  
 178. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 211.  
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oil, which is the antecedent of “such incident,” the Coast Guard 
interpreted the “results from such incident” language as meaning only 
that damages resulting from the discharge or threat of discharge of oil 
into navigable waters are covered.179 By parsing the language in this 
way, the Coast Guard interpreted “incident” to mean the actual 
discharge or threat of discharge of oil, rather than the actual statutory 
definition that encompasses “any occurrence or series of 
occurrences.”180 As such, Gatlin could not recover damages for the 
fire.181 The court reasoned that the fire did not cause the discharge or 
threat of discharge of oil, and therefore, such damages did not fall 
within the Coast Guard’s interpretation.182 
This narrow parsing directly contradicts the court in Conoco, 
which emphasized the statutory cannon articulated in Dole.183 It further 
contradicts the holdings in both Conoco and Hyundai, which read the 
definitions of “incident,” “removal,” “removal costs,” and “result 
from,” broadly in order to allow recovery for the Coast Guard, while 
here the Coast Guard reads the same provisions as narrowly as possible 
to deny recovery for Gatlin. Judge Niemeyer’s dissent in Gatlin further 
emphasized a broad interpretation of the statutory definitions, 
highlighting the fact that Gatlin’s fire “damages ‘resulted from’ the 
vandals’ discharge of oil, a discharge which both polluted 
navigable waters and immediately threatened to pollute navigable 
waters.”184 More dangerous still is the possibility of future responsible 
parties limiting their own liability based on this narrow parsing of 
“such” and its antecedent.185 If this decision were to control, 
responsible parties could argue that, under Gatlin, they are only 
responsible for the damages caused by the actual oil reaching navigable 
waters and nothing else. It would likely even limit the ability of the 
Coast Guard itself to recover monitoring costs as it had in Conoco and 
Hyundai, since personnel salaries do not cause the discharge or 
 
 179. Id.  
 180. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14) (2012).  
 181. It is important to note that Gatlin’s definition of incident is nonsensical as it contemplates 
the effect, i.e. the discharge of oil, before the cause, i.e. the vandals opening the drums. In 
traditional language structure, the effect cannot come before the cause. OPA’s definition of 
“incident” is far clearer than the age old, which came first, the chicken or the egg debate.  
However, this is precisely the question the court in Gatlin poses, and incorrectly answers. Further 
still, the facts clearly indicate that the fire was a result of the vapors released by the oil, and as 
such, the fire is really the only damage caused by the discharge of oil. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 209.  
 182. Id. at 212. 
 183. See Holmen supra note 177. 
 184. Gatlin, 169 F.3d at 214–15.  
 185. Holmen, supra note 177, at 1909.  
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substantial discharge of oil.186 This clearly contravenes the intent of 
Congress in enacting OPA and even creates a window of liability 
narrower than that found in the impetus for OPA, the Exxon Valdez 
spill. 
VI. SHUTDOWN CASES 
There are several cases when the shutdown of bodies of water 
caused economic loss that the courts agreed to hear or grant damages. 
In such cases, authorities (generally the Coast Guard) shut down a 
waterway after a spill in order to respond to, contain, and cleanup the 
oil.187 Those individuals and businesses that are unable to access the 
water, either as a route to other locations or for economic purposes, 
have been allowed to bring economic loss claims under § 
2702(b)(2)(E).188 In the dismissal of the BP Moratorium claims, Judge 
Barbier held that the Moratorium was distinguishable from these 
cases.189 This holding, however, reads OPA’s liability provision too 
narrowly. The Moratorium claims are very similar to claims resulting 
from closure of a river or a bayou and, as such, should be permitted. 
In In re Settoon Towing, LLC, the Eastern District of Louisiana 
allowed claims for economic loss due to the inability to reach a 
production platform and the mere prospect of litigation arising from 
the closure of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.190 The conflict at issue 
occurred on January 20, 2007, when the M/V CATHY M. SETTOON 
was pushing a large barge and struck a well owned and operated by 
ExPert Oil & Gas, LLC in Bayou Perot.191 Barataria Production 
Services (BPS), a production company, issued a written demand on 
ExPert for damages because it was unable to access its production 
platform during the cleanup process.192 ExPert, in turn, sought damages 
from the responsible party, Settoon Towing.193 Settoon argued that 
under Robins, ExPert could not allege economic damages for a third 
party without evidence of physical injury to a proprietary interest.194 
The court disagreed, noting that “OPA legislative history makes it 
 
 186. Holmen, supra note 177, at 1919.  
 187. See, e.g., In re Settoon Towing, LLC, No. 07-CV-1263, 2009 WL 4730969, at *1 (E.D. La. 
Dec. 4, 2009) (arising from the closure of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway). 
 188. See, e.g., id. (considering a claim for economic loss). 
 189. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 968 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 190. Settoon Towing, 2009 WL 4730969, at *4. 
 191. Id. at *1.  
 192. Id. at *2.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
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clear that to recover damages under section 2702(b)(2)(E), ‘the 
claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources 
to recover for lost profits or income.’”195 As such, the court ruled that 
ExPert may assert such claims against Settoon and denied Settoon’s 
Motion for Summary Judgement.196 
The court then discussed ExPert’s claim for damages for 
“potential suits seeking economic damages for the shutdown of the 
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.”197 Despite the fact that no such suits had 
been brought, the court held that ExPert could maintain such claims.198 
It stated that “[t]he potential suits described by ExPert are similar to 
the claim made against it by BPS, i.e. claims by other businesses who 
suffered economic losses because they could not conduct business due 
to the ICW shutdown.”199 In other words, the court recognized the 
possibility that a shutdown of a waterway could affect many businesses, 
and that it is contrary to OPA to limit such claims. Interestingly, the 
court relied on the erroneous definitions provided by Gatlin Oil, 
specifically that “the claimant must show that the damage resulted 
from a discharge or threatened discharge of oil into navigable waters or 
the adjacent shoreline.”200  OPA is clearly intended to cover damages 
that result from the incident, not the discharge of oil itself. Despite this 
fact, shutdown cases still fall within what the court holds as the purview 
of OPA’s liability provisions. 
The Western District of Louisiana has similarly held that OPA’s 
liability provisions cover economic damages resulting from waterway 
shutdowns. In Dunham-Price Group, LLC, et al. v. Citgo Petroleum 
Corp., the court denied Citgo’s motion for summary judgment barring 
economic damages claims resulting from the closure of 22 miles of the 
Calcasieu River following a spill from its Lake Charles refinery.201 
Dunham Price owns and operates a concrete facility several miles 
upriver from Citgo’s refinery and the zone closed by the Coast 
Guard.202 It alleged that it sustained damages from loss of use, 
increased expenses, and business interruption resulting from the 
 
 195. Id. at *4 (citing Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. v. Jays Seafood, Inc., 444 F.3d 371, 382–83 (5th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994))). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. (quoting Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207, 212 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
 201. Dunham-Price Grp., LLC v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 2:07-CV-1019, 2010 WL 
1285446, at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010).  
 202. Id. 
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closure.203 In its ruling, the court cited the same Taira Lynn rule, also 
cited in Settoon, that the claimant need not own the damaged property 
or resources to recover economic losses.204 The court simply noted that 
the Calcasieu River meets OPA’s definition of a natural resource and 
that Citgo admitted to negligently discharging 30,000 gallons of oil.205 
For this reason, the court held that Dunham had presented enough 
evidence for a trier of fact to decide whether the economic damages 
were a result of the incident.206 
Finally, in a recent case, the Eastern District of Louisiana once 
again held that economic damages due to shutdowns are appropriate 
under OPA.207 On July 23, 2008, the M/V TINTOMARA, an ocean-
going tanker, collided with a barge, owned by American Commercial 
Lines, LLC (ACL), carrying thousands of barrels of oil, resulting in an 
oil spill in the Mississippi River near New Orleans, Louisiana.208 The 
Coast Guard closed 29 miles of the Lower Mississippi River following 
the spill, reopening it to traffic seven days later on July 30, 2008.209 The 
court rejected ACL’s assertion that the U.S. could not recover 
payments made out of the Fund “to a claimant that failed to establish 
that the loss was caused by the oil spill,” particularly those “incurred 
solely as a result of the Coast Guard’s closing of the Mississippi 
River.”210 The court rejected this contention, noting that: 
The courts in this circuit have refused to make oiling of physical 
property a prerequisite for recovery of damages under the OPA; 
instead, they have found triable issues of fact as to causation when 
claimants seek damages for loss of business resulting from the closure 
or loss of use of a natural resource such as a river.211 
ACL relied on Taira Lynn and the Moratorium case at issue in 
this article as supporting its position that such economic damages are 
not recoverable under OPA.212 Taira Lynn, quoted above, is 
irrelevant,213 and Deepwater Horizon was wrongly decided. In any 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at *2. 
 205. Id. at *2–3. 
 206. Id. at *3. 
 207. United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, LLC, No. 11-CV-2076, 2016 WL 4987208, at *1 
(E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016). 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at *5. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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event, the court in ACL held that neither case adequately supported 
ACL’s position.214 
It is important to highlight the court’s language in describing the 
natural resource damages. That language, unlike the language in all of 
the above cases, does not cite Gatlin’s incorrect position that there 
must be damage from the oil; rather, it states that economic loss claims 
may “result[] from the closure or loss of use of a natural resource such 
as a river.”215 This points to the incident rather than the direct oiling as 
suggested in Gatlin. The Moratorium, in essence a very large shutdown, 
was the direct result of the incident. 
VII.   THE OIL-LESS OPA CASE 
Throughout the Moratorium claims arguments and subsequent 
decisions both Transocean and Judge Barbier highlight and referenced 
a Fifth Circuit case as pertaining to OPA causation.216 In fact, the cited 
case lacked an actual oil spill, and its limited OPA discussion relied on 
the wrongly decided Gatlin decision.217 In Taira Lynn Marie Ltd. No. 
5, LLC v. Jays Seafood, Inc. a tug and its tow carrying “a gaseous 
mixture of propylene/propane” allided with a bridge in St. Mary Parish, 
Louisiana, releasing the gas into the surrounding area, resulting in a 
temporary evacuation of the businesses and residences within a 
designated radius of the bridge.218 The businesses that were forced to 
evacuate brought damages claims, including claims for purely 
economic losses, under general maritime law, CERCLA, OPA, and 
state law.219 
The district court found that there was a geographical exception 
to the general rule that purely economic losses were not recoverable 
without physical damage, thereby allowing claimants with such claims 
a chance to pursue them in court.220 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit barred 
recovery based on the M/V TESTBANK rule, noting that there is no 
such geographical exception.221 Further, although it addressed OPA, 
the court seemed skeptical that the statute even applied and did not 
address the liability provision § 2702(a) or the “result from” 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (emphasis added). 
 216. Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. v. Jays Seafood, Inc., 444 F.3d 371, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2006).  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 375–76. 
 219. Id. at 376. 
 220. Id. (citing In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (W.D. La. 2004)). 
 221. Id. at 378. 
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language.222 When deciding that claimants could not recover under 
OPA, the court relied on the wrongly decided Gatlin decision.223 If 
OPA were to apply, the court should have read the liability provision 
rather than the Gatlin decision, which would have analyzed the 
economic losses based on the incident (i.e. the allision, rather than the 
release of the gas). If gas is synonymous with oil, the claimants should 
have been able to recover under OPA, because their losses resulted 
from the allision, the resulting release of gas, and the evacuation. 
However, it is not clear that gas is synonymous with oil, and as 
such, it is not likely that the claims should have even been evaluated 
under OPA.224 Further still, the court reluctantly addressed OPA, but 
relied more heavily on M/V TESTBANK in its decision to dismiss the 
economic damage claims.225 As discussed extensively above, OPA 
replaced the M/V TESTBANK rule in order to allow more claimants 
to recover from the multifaceted damage of an oil spill.226 As such, 
though Taira Lynn states the general proposition that OPA allows for 
purely economic damages,227 it is not exemplar OPA case law. The 
court was hesitant to hold that OPA was applicable and when it did, 
refrained from discussing both causation and liability. However, OPA 
is unquestionably applicable in the Moratorium case. When dismissing 
the Moratorium claims, Judge Barbier relied almost entirely on the 
Taira Lynn decision even though he recognized that “Taira Lynn does 
not align perfectly with the cases at hand because the gaseous discharge 
caused no direct damage to property or resources (whether owned by 
 
 222. Id. at 383. The court posits: “Even assuming arguendo that OPA applies, none of the 
claimants has raised an issue of fact as to whether any property damage was caused by the 
pollution incident, i.e., the release of the gaseous cargo. A party is liable under OPA if, inter alia, 
the claimant’s damages result from such incident, i.e., the discharge or threatened discharge of 
oil.” See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012) (emphasis added); Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 
207, 210–11 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The Coast Guard has interpreted the Act to provide that only 
removal costs and damages that ‘result from such incident’ are compensable.”) citing § 2702(a). 
 223. Taira Lynn, 444 F.3d at 382–83.  
 224. There is good evidence that a propane/propylene mixture contains hydrogen sulfide, 
which is listed as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) 
(2012).  OPA defines oil as “oil of any kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, 
oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil but does not include any substance 
which is specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) 
through (F) of section 101(14) of [CERCLA].”  33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (2012) (emphasis added). 
When CERCLA is cross referenced, it provides that hazardous substance includes “any 
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the [CAA].” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(E) (2012).  
It follows then that the mixture discharged in Taira Lynn is a hazardous substance covered by the 
CAA and CERCLA and not OPA.  
 225. Taira Lynn, 444 F.3d at 378–79.   
 226. See Robertson, supra note 41. 
 227. See generally In re Taira Lynn, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (W.D. La. 2004). 
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the plaintiffs or not), whereas the HORIZON/Macondo spill caused 
extensive damage to property and resources.”228 If Judge Barbier 
wished to rely on Taira Lynn despite its tenuous OPA claims, he 
would, in effect, be relying on the Gatlin decision, and if that were to 
apply to the HORIZON/Macondo spill, which, as he readily notes 
caused extensive damage, injuries resulting from such damage would 
be covered. Those injuries include the Moratorium claims. 
VIII.   THE MORATORIUM CLAIMS FALL WITHIN THE DAMAGES 
CONTEMPLATED BY § 2702(B)(2)(E) 
On March 10, 2016, Judge Barbier of the Eastern District of 
Louisiana granted BP’s Motion to Dismiss Moratoria/Permitoria 
Claims, thereby dismissing the economic damage claims brought by 
members of the oil industry following the Moratorium on drilling in the 
Gulf of Mexico.229 To reiterate, Secretary Ken Salazar announced on 
May 6, 2010 that “as a result of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and 
spill . . . no applications for drilling permits [would] go forward for any 
new offshore drilling ‘activity’”230 pending his report to the president 
which was released on May 27 and recommended “(1) a six month 
moratorium on permits for new wells being drilled using floating rigs 
and (2) an immediate halt to drilling operations on the 33 permitted 
wells that [were] currently being drilled using floating rigs in the Gulf 
of Mexico.”231 The Moratorium was challenged under the APA, 
resulting in a preliminary injunction forcing the Secretary to reissue a 
revised Moratorium, which was released on July 12, 2010.232 Despite 
the fact that the Moratorium was scheduled to last six months, it was 
lifted on October 12, 2010.233 Members of the B1 bundle sued under 
OPA for the economic damages they suffered as a result of the 
Moratorium and resultant backlog of permit evaluation at the Marine 
Management Service, known as the Permitoria.234 The plaintiffs in 
question, who make up one of the test cases for the MDL, included a 
marine salvage and commercial diving business; an offshore platform 
rig provider; a salvager of offshore production equipment; an oil and 
 
 228. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F.Supp.3d 908, 917 (E.D. La. 2016). 
 229. Id. at 917–18.  
 230. Id. at 910 (quoting Hornbeck Offshore Servs. v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 
2013)). 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 910–11.   
 233. Id. at 911.   
 234. Id.   
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gas exploration and production company; a drilling services contractor; 
and a heavy material handling equipment inspection, maintenance, and 
service company.235 
In its opinion, the court notes that BP is liable for damages under 
§ 2702(b)(2)(E) “if, inter alia, the claimant’s damages ‘result from such 
incident,’ i.e., the discharge or threatened discharge of oil,”236 which is 
a direct quotation from Taira Lynn. As noted above, Taira Lynn 
extrapolated this definition from Gatlin, which wrongly construed the 
definition of incident to mean only the discharge of oil.237 Both the 
court and Gatlin have failed to apply the proper statutory cannon to 
their definition of “incident.” Where Congress includes language in 
one section, but omits it in another, it can be presumed that that 
omission was intentional.238 § 2702(b)(2)(F) specifies that its particular 
damages were “caused by a discharge of oil.”239 If Congress wished § 
2702(b)(2)(E) to also be dependent on damage caused by the discharge 
of oil, it would have explicitly stated such a requirement. 
Furthermore, Taira Lynn is a poor example of OPA case law, as 
it does not deal with the discharge or threatened discharge of oil. 
Rather, it deals with a gaseous mixture that the Taira Lynn court was 
not even sure fell within the purview of OPA.240 Strangely, the Fifth 
Circuit states that “because the connection between the 
HORIZON/Macondo incident and the Moratorium is even more 
attenuated than the gaseous release and mandatory evacuation in Taira 
Lynn…the court’s conclusion here is certainly consistent with Taira 
Lynn.”241 Again, there is no need to be consistent with a case that 
barely contains an OPA claim. Moreover, it is hard to see how a case 
involving the largest oil spill in U.S. history and the resultant closure of 
the Gulf, that the court readily concedes is due to the spill, is more 
attenuated than a last-ditch effort to classify a propane/propylene 
gaseous mixture as oil. 
As noted previously, the court relied almost exclusively on Taira 
Lynn to formulate its opinion. Following its discussion of the definition 
of liability provided by Taira Lynn, it concludes: 
 
 235. Id. at 912–13. 
 236. Id. at 914 (quoting Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. v. Jays Seafood, 444 F.3d 371, 383 (5th Cir. 
2006)).  
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 178–80.  
 238. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
 239. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(F) (2012).  
 240. Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. v. Jays Seafood, 444 F.3d 371, 383 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 241. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908, 917 (E.D. La. 2016). 
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“Reading § 2701(a) and § 2702(b)(2)(E) together, Plaintiffs must 
establish that their economic losses were ‘due to’ the injury, 
destruction, or loss of property or natural resources that ‘result[ed] 
from’ the discharge or threatened discharge of oil from the 
HORIZON/Macondo well (i.e., the ‘incident’).”242 
If the court’s interpretation is correct, the plaintiffs would need to 
prove that the discharge of oil damaged property or natural resources 
and that such damage caused their economic loss.243 This echoes 
Professor Goldberg’s two-step use right analysis discussed at length in 
his highly criticized memo commissioned by Mr. Feinberg.244 Once 
again, this wrongly adds a second layer of causational proof to the 
Plaintiff’s burden while continuing to ignore the statutory definition of 
“incident.”245 As discussed extensively above, congressional intent 
proves that the “due to” language is the same as the “result from” 
language, and no second layer of proof was ever intended under the 
liability provisions.246 It is a strict liability standard. Any other 
interpretation is invalid because the two-step evaluation requires a 
proximate causation standard that certainly was not intended by 
Congress. 
Furthermore, because the court relied on the definitions provided 
in Taira Lynn to reach this two-step conclusion, it is also relying on 
Gatlin. As noted previously, Gatlin sets dangerous precedent that 
highlights and favors the discharge or threatened discharge of oil over 
 
 242. Id. at 916.  
 243. Interestingly, in the original opinion denying BP’s motion to dismiss regarding the B1 
claims, Judge Barbier cites CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701–03 (2011) when 
recognizing that Congress did not intend for “due to” and “resulting from” language to be a 
proximate causation standard.  In re ““Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 966 (E.D. La. 
2011).  He quotes the CSX court: “Congress, it is true, has written the words ‘proximate cause’ 
into a number of statutes.  But when the legislative text uses less legalistic language e.g. ‘caused 
by,’ ‘occasioned by,’ ‘in consequence of,’ . . . and the legislative purpose is to loosen constraints 
on recovery, there is little reason for courts to hark back to stock, judge-made proximate cause, 
formulations.” Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc., 564 U.S. at 702–03).  In fact CSX dealt with the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and its causation standard.  Notably, FELA holds 
railroads liable for injuries “resulting in whole or in part from [carrier] negligence,” language that 
is strikingly similar to OPA. CSX Transp., Inc., 564 U.S. at 703.  Justice Ginsburg held that FELA 
does not contain a proximate causation standard, but rather “a defendant railroad ʻcaused or 
contributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ʻif [the railroad’s] negligence played a part – no matter 
how small – in bringing about the injury.’” Id. at 705.  If OPA’s analogous language is applied in 
the same manner, a responsible party would be liable for damages that “result from” the 
“incident,” which does not include a two-step analysis, but a showing of a nexus between the 
incident and the damage.  
 244. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (2012). 
 245. 33 U.S.C. at § 2702(b)(2)(F). 
 246. See discussion supra Section III. 
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the incident, i.e. occurrences that precipitated the discharge, going so 
far as to only compensate the company for the oil that reached 
navigable waters.247 Once again, future polluters could easily use this 
to mean that they are only responsible for those damages that arise 
from oil touching and damaging natural resources. Again, this directly 
contravenes Congress’ intent to compensate those who suffer 
economic losses – an intention that does not require the two-step 
proximate cause showing championed by Gatlin, Taira Lynn, Professor 
Goldberg, and the In re Gulf Oil Spill court. Thus, despite the fact that 
the court did not explicitly address the causation issue under OPA, it 
still implicitly read the incorrect causation standard—proximate 
causation—into the liability provisions. 
Such an improper reading is not surprising, given that the Fifth 
Circuit, as John Costonis noted, has a “self-confessed instinct for the 
‘reflexive invocation of admiralty jurisdiction,’” which demands such a 
proximate causation standard.248 Unlike traditional maritime law, 
which is almost entirely judge-made, OPA provides a statutory remedy 
designed to work with regulations. Costonis notes “OPA’s 
compensation and liability provisions are intricately crafted to pair 
with a command and control regulatory program on the one side, and 
a variety of civil and criminal fines and penalties on the other.”249 It 
leaves little room for judges to construct rules and remedies to fill what 
they perceive as interstitial gaps in the statute. Costonis is concerned 
that the BI Bundle ruling, prior to, and ultimately affecting the 
outcome of the Moratorium claims, “aggressively carves out an 
independent, parallel track, coequal with OPA, for a maritime regime 
that addresses the same question to which OPA speaks, but in a 
different and pervasively incompatible manner.”250 This incompatible 
manner is self-evident in the court’s reading of the liability provisions, 
creating a maritime-esque, two-step proximate causation standard. 
While there are certainly instances in which the court has a duty 
to fill gaps in Congress’ lawmaking, the comprehensive nature and 
 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 178–82. 
 248. John J. Costonis, The BP Bundle Ruling: Federal Statutory Displacement of General 
Maritime Law (Part I), 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10022, 10025 (2014) (citations 
omitted). In a two-part series, Costonis lays out the reasons why the BI Bundle ruling preserving 
federal maritime is incorrect and incompatible with an accurate reading of OPA. Because the BI 
Bundle left many of the traditional maritime law negligence tort remedies for economic and 
property losses intact, it allowed the court to fill perceived gaps with maritime theory rather than 
adhering to OPA’s already comprehensive liability scheme when deciding the Moratorium claims.  
 249. Id. at 10030. 
 250. Id. at 10026.  
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parallel issues present in OPA and maritime law discussion in the B1 
Bundle and the Moratorium preclude any such gap-filling. Traditional 
displacement theory can only function within constitutional bounds 
when there exist certain gaps and windows that fall within the 
displacement lexicon.251 Costonis hazards that courts may use such 
technical lexicon terms to isolate portions of statutes to create gaps and 
windows for their rulings to fill.252 However, the actual purpose “is to 
determine Congress’ intent, not to make a fetish of one or more of 
these labels, as BI Bundle does, by exiling OPA to a non-displacement 
no-man’s-land somewhere between ‘occupation of an entire field’ and 
‘speaking directly’ to some particular feature of the maritime tort.”253 
In short, a court should not attempt to shoehorn a mangled version of 
maritime law into a statute designed to replace a “‘fragmented 
collection of Federal and State laws’ with a ‘single Federal law 
providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil 
pollution.’”254 
When the incompatible maritime track is set aside and OPA’s 
liability provisions are read correctly, plaintiffs are able to recover the 
economic losses suffered because of the Moratorium. After advancing 
a proximate causation standard, the court candidly states, “[t]here can 
be no doubt that the Government would not have imposed the 
Moratorium had the HORIZON/Macondo blowout and oil spill not 
occurred.”255 In effect, it admits causation. However, it then incorrectly 
parses the words of the Moratorium and emphasizes the Secretary’s 
concern for the “possible future blowouts and oil spills from wells other 
than Macondo.”256 It states that “the perceived threats of discharge 
from other wells are different OPA ‘incidents’ (if these are OPA 
incidents at all) than the HORIZON/Macondo incident for which BP 
is a responsible party.”257 When analyzing the Moratorium, the court 
uses the incorrect two-step proximate causation standard, thereby 
 
 251. John J. Costonis, The BP Bundle Ruling: Federal Statutory Displacement of General 
Maritime Law (Part II), 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10108, 10108–09 (2014). 
 252. Id. at 10109–12. 
 253. Id. at 10112. 
 254. See Costonis, supra note 251, at 10027. 
 255. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908, 916 (E.D. La. 2016). Note that the court 
avoids using the language originally used by Secretary Salazar “as a result of the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion and spill . . .” Secretary Salazar highlights the statutory language, “result of,” 
as well as the incident, “explosion,” and the result “spill.” Without further parsing of the 
moratorium language, such a construction satisfies the statutory requirements. Id. at 910. 
 256. Id. at 916. 
 257. Id. By reading the perceived threats as separate incidents, the court is essentially reading 
in the superseding and intervening causes for which BP argued.  
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denying the Moratoria plaintiffs their recovery. It incorrectly uses the 
“result from” language to find that the Moratorium did not result from 
the incident, and following this conclusion, brushes aside the plaintiff’s 
valid claims. In direct contradiction of its own definition of liability, 
namely that there must be damage to natural resources, it states: 
In OPA terms, then – and putting aside the question of whether 
‘plaintiffs’ claims are due to the injury, destruction, or loss of property 
or natural resources – the OPA Test Case Plaintiffs’ losses did not 
result from the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil from 
the Macondo Well: the resulted from the perceived threat (whether 
substantial or not) of discharge from other wells.258 
Once again, the liability provisions of OPA contemplate damages 
that “result from such incident,”259 where “incident” is defined as “any 
occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, involving 
one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting in 
the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil.”260 The incident 
is not defined by the discharge; the discharge is defined by the incident. 
The incident is the series of occurrences leading up to the discharge or 
threat of discharge—the actual punishable actions of the responsible 
party.261 To read it as the former would once again create a narrow 
loophole for possible responsible parties to avoid liability for wrongful 
actions were the discharge to precede the event.262 The incident in the 
immediate case is the blowout, explosion, subsequent fire, and sinking 
of the Deepwater Horizon, which most certainly resulted in the 
discharge of oil. The Moratorium was issued as a result of this incident, 
and the court itself concedes this.263 Regardless of whether or not the 
Secretary enumerated other reasons for the Moratorium (namely that 
there were not enough response vessels in case of another spill and 
there was general concern for the safety practices of the industry264), 
the fact remains that the Moratorium resulted from the incident, i.e. 
the blowout, explosion, subsequent fire and sinking of Deepwater 
 
 258. Id. If read together, it seems the court only intends for the true definition of “incident” 
to be considered in the first step of its analysis. It then changes the definition to mean only the 
discharge in the second step, precluding recovery by the Plaintiffs. It has written itself in circles, 
creating an unintelligible liability standard.  
 259. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012). 
 260. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14) (2012).  
 261. Id. 
 262. See discussion supra p. 49.  
 263. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908, 911 (E.D. La. 2016).  
 264. Id. at 916.  
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Horizon.265 All of the Secretary’s enumerated reasons for the 
Moratorium originate from the blowout. 
The Coast Guard declared the Deepwater Horizon disaster a 
“Spill of National Significance” under the National Contingency Plan, 
the first in U.S. history.266 Such a spill may be declared when it is “so 
complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, 
local, and responsible party resources to contain and clean up the 
discharge.”267 It is no wonder then that the Secretary had concerns 
about the number of response vessels necessary to attend to the 
Deepwater Horizon, leaving serious gaps in the resources available to 
respond to other spills. But it is clear that the response vessels were all 
deployed as a result of the incident. The declaration of the Spill of 
National Significance requiring an unprecedented amount of response 
resources and the resulting concern that there were not enough 
resources to address another spill in the Gulf were results of the 
incident. Further still, the “perceived weakness of industry-wide safety 
measures,”268 was not perceived until the incident occurred and, as such, 
is a result of the incident. In sum, and in the words of Judge Barbier, 
“[t]here can be no doubt that the Government would not have imposed 
the Moratorium [with all of its enumerated factors] had the 
HORIZON/Macondo blowout and oil spill not occurred.”269 
BP proffered a number of dubious arguments as to why the 
Moratorium was not a result of the Deepwater Horizon incident.270 
However, given the lengthy analysis provided by this article, it is clear 
that none of them are viable under OPA. Despite this, the court, 
without any plausible statutory explanation,271 accepted many of them 
as true and dismissed the economic claims of many deserving plaintiffs. 
Generally, BP’s ultimate argument was that there was some sort of 
blanket Moratorium defense.272 Such a defense directly contravenes 
the agreement by all parties involved that this issue, and OPA 
causation in general, is a fact-intensive inquiry.273 To prove its blanket 
defense, BP argued that there was some sort of shift of responsibility 
 
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. at 909–10. 
 267. Id. at 909 n.1 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2016)).  
 268. Id. at 916.  
 269. Id. (alteration to original).  
 270. Id. at 914.  
 271. See discussion supra Section II, III, IV (arguing that the court improperly interpreted 
OPA’s liability provision). 
 272. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 914. 
 273. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 965–66 (E.D. La. 2011).  
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to a third party i.e. the United States government, or that this was a 
superseding cause, which is generally reserved for proximate causation 
arguments.274 The Plaintiffs highlight the impropriety of considering 
third party decisions in assessing causation: 
Yet, taking BP’s current arguments to their logical conclusion, 
none of these [economic damage] plaintiffs would arguably be entitled 
to recover: The Government makes deliberate decisions about which 
areas are closed to commercial fishermen; tourists and other travelers 
ultimately decide whether they will make or cancel travel plans; hotel 
operators decide whether they will lay off employees, cut hours, or 
reduce wages; the Coast Guard makes deliberate decisions about 
whether to suspend navigation on a river; and different potential 
purchasers are motivated by numerous considerations when they 
decide whether, where, and at what price to buy or lease property, 
frequent restaurants, or obtain new furniture.275 
The suggested shift precludes all factual inquiry into the fault of 
BP. As noted above, the government negligence exception found in the 
CWA was not included in OPA and therefore cannot be invoked here. 
In addition, the very strict defenses to liability require that fault be 
placed entirely on a third party: an act of God or a war.276 None of these 
defenses could be, let alone actually were, proved by BP. 
One manifestation of the blanket Moratorium defense was BP’s 
argument that the “Moratorium was not an unavoidable mandatory 
response to the oil spill, but instead newly crafted measures designed 
to facilitate an industry-wide review of drilling practices and, therefore, 
discretionary acts aimed at avoiding future spills.”277 As previously 
noted, the Moratorium and its enumerated reasons for existence were 
all a result of the incident. Further still, nowhere in the statute does it 
state that the response actions of the government must be 
“unavoidable” or “mandatory.” BP is once again grafting requirements 
into the statute beyond what Congress intended. In fact, the 
Moratorium fits well within the definition of “remove” or “removal” 
found in § 2701(30). As discussed previously, under § 2701(30), 
“remove” or “removal” includes not only the physical containment and 
removal of oil, but also the “taking of other actions as may be necessary 
 
 274. “Deepwater Horizon” 168 F. Supp. 3d at 914. 
 275. Opposition to BP’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss the So-Called “Moratoria” and 
“Permitoria” Claims,  “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (““No. 10-
MD02179) 
 276. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2012). 
 277. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 914. 
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to minimize or mitigate damage to public health or welfare.”278 
Therefore, the Moratorium falls under the definition of “remove” or” 
removal,” for it was a step taken to minimize or mitigate damage to 
public health or welfare, namely through prevention of another spill 
and addressing industry wide safety issues brought to light by the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill. 
Ignoring the fact that the Moratorium fits within the definition of 
“removal” under OPA, the court also distinguishes it from the 
“shutdown cases,” cited by the Plaintiffs, specifically (and only) 
Dunham-Price. As discussed above, Dunham-Price and the rest of the 
shutdown cases are analogous to the Moratorium situation.279 These 
shutdowns were the result of cleanup efforts, which include removal 
measures. The court states, with no explanation, that “[s]ignificantly, 
and unlike the Moratorium, the river closure was part of the effort to 
contain and clean up the spill from defendant’s facility.”280 It is not clear 
how the Moratorium is significantly unlike “part of [an] effort to 
contain and clean up” the BP oil gushing into the Gulf at an alarming 
rate. The Moratorium itself notes that there were a record number of 
resources deployed to aid in this regard, which was part of the impetus 
for its issuance.281 Moreover, the Moratorium, as an action considered 
necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or 
welfare, fits within the definition of “remove” or “removal.” Dunham-
Price emphasized the fact that the Calcasieu River, the closed body of 
water of concern, met OPA’s definition of a natural resource, and its 
closure warrants the plaintiff’s claims.282 
Furthermore, ACL notes that the Fifth Circuit has found triable 
issues of fact where “claimants seek damages for loss of business 
resulting from the closure or loss of use of a natural resource such as a 
river.”283 Thus, it is the closure of the resource, not the oiling, that 
courts consider significant; the incident rather than the discharge or 
threat of discharge is the key component of closure analysis. It is 
analogous to the claims of a fisherman: when he claims economic 
 
 278. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(30) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 279. Dunham-Price Grp., LLC v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 2:07-CV-1019, 2010 WL 
1285446, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010).  
 280. “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 916. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Dunham-Price Grp. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp, 2010 WL 1285446, at *3 (W.D. La. 2010). 
 283. United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, LLC, No. 11-CV-2076, 2016 WL 4987208, at *5 
(E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016). ACL attempted to argue that economic damages resulting from the 
closure, rather than the direct oiling, were not compensable under OPA.  The court clearly 
disagreed.  
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damage, it is not for the loss of oiled fish, but rather, his inability to 
access the fish.284 Likewise, the Moratorium, has impeded the plaintiff 
companies from reaching or pursuing their business. In fact, even 
Professor Goldberg observed that “if a spill were to deprive 
commercial fishermen of expected profits by killing fish they ordinarily 
would catch and sell, or by causing authorities to bar the fishermen from 
accessing those fish for a period of time, the fishermen would be entitled 
to recover.”285 The Moratorium claims, like those of the fishermen, are 
far from remote. These plaintiffs were barred from accessing their 
trade as a result of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.286 The Moratorium 
is clearly a response to the spill, and resulted in the closure of a natural 
resource identically, save for its much larger scale, to the “shutdown 
cases.” 
The court highlights the fact that the Plaintiffs “assert that the 
Government has imposed drilling moratoria every year from 1982 
through 2008, yet Plaintiffs cite no cases in which a private party has 
been held liable (under OPA or other law) for losses caused by a 
Moratorium.”287 It concludes that the absence of such cases indicates 
that the plaintiffs’ claims are not recoverable.288 Putting aside the fact 
that this logic flies in the face of our justice system, this Moratorium, 
like the oil spill it resulted from, is unique. Generally, moratoria are 
implemented for political, economic, and scientific reasons, often with 
international relations considerations.289 The moratoria cited by the 
plaintiffs address political motives, but some did indeed follow oil 
spills.290 However, the court incorrectly characterizes the lawsuits that 
followed. Because many of the spills cited by the plaintiffs pre-date 
OPA, a moratorium would not have been a triable issue.291 For those 
that came after OPA’s 1990 passage, at least two of the cited cases 
settled out of court, but not before finding that shutdown claims were 
triable under OPA’s liability standard.292 However, unlike these 
 
 284. See “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 918, n.11. 
 285. Robertson, supra note 41, at 164 (quoting Goldberg, supra note 72).   
 286.  “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 912 (quoting Blake Complaint para. 60, No.13-
1185, Rec. Doc. 1).  
 287. Id. at 917. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See generally CURRY L. HAGERTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41133, OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF MORATORIA ON OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT (2011).  
 290. Opposition to BP’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss the So-Called “Moratoria” and 
“Permitoria” Claims at 11–12, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F.Supp.3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) 
(No. 10MD02179). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id.; see In re Settoon Towing, No. 07-1263, 2009 WL 4730969, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 
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relatively small spills and closures, the BP Disaster and subsequent 
Moratorium is unprecedented in its size and scope.293 Furthermore, as 
noted by the Secretary himself, this unique Moratorium was the direct 
result of the Deepwater Horizon blowout. 
The argument that the Moratorium would have happened 
regardless of whether or not a spill occurred does not negate the fact 
that it resulted from the Deepwater Horizon blowout. This situation is 
analogous to the situation in Hyundai, where Hyundai argued that 
Coast Guard salaries do not fall under response and removal costs 
because they would have been paid regardless of whether or not they 
were responding to an OPA incident.294 As discussed above, the court 
correctly held that such salaries did result from the incident, noting 
“[t]he fact that, if this near-disaster had not occurred, the personnel 
would have been paid to perform some other task does not alter the 
reality that the mishap did occur and the Coast Guard personnel were 
paid to monitor a potential spill.”295 Likewise, the fact that a 
moratorium would likely have occurred for different reasons does not 
change the fact that this specific Moratorium was a result of the 
incident; as such, the plaintiffs are entitled to their economic damages. 
The fact that “the Coast Guard, as part of its administration of the 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, has denied claims that are ‘a direct result 
of the moratorium, not a direct result of an oil discharge’”296 has little 
bearing on whether or not the Moratorium resulted from the 
incident.297 In fact, the Coast Guard, as noted above, has a tendency to 
interpret regulations in its favor and in such a way that hinders 
industry, regardless of whether or not industry claims are valid and 
compensable.298 Unfortunately, it appears that the court is 
perpetuating the prejudice against the oil industry evidenced in 
 
2009); Dunham-Price Grp. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 2:07-CV-1019, 2010 WL 1285446, at *3 
(W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010). 
 293. “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 909–10.  
 294. United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 295. Id.  
 296. In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 918.  
 297. In Nguyen v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., Nos. 11–1799, 11–2705, 2014 WL 
3587490, at *1 (E.D. La. July 18, 2014), Judge Lemelle correctly notes “it is clear that 33 C.F.R. 
§136.105 [The Coast Guard regulation regarding presentment] is inapplicable to claims to 
responsible parties because the Coast Guard lacks any rule-making authority concerning claims to 
entities other than the [Oil Spill Trust Fund”],” meaning the Coast Guard has not been delegated 
any binding, rule-making authority. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). As such, decisions it makes 
regarding the Fund cannot be used as legal precedent. Id.  
 298. See Holmen, supra note 177, at 1909.  
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Conoco, Hyundai, and Gatlin.299 It makes very little sense and in fact 
directly disregards the purpose of statutory authority to read a statute 
differently based solely on who is bringing a claim. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
OPA is an important law that very plainly sought to alter the 
dynamics of any post-oil spill litigation. Indeed, its clear language was 
designed to induce potentially responsible parties to adhere to 
heighted standards of care to avoid spills. In the future, courts should 
aim to adhere to statutory cannon: “[i]n construing a statute, the court 
is ‘guided not by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [must] 
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”300 
The Oil Pollution Act’s obvious policy, as iterated by numerous House 
and Senate reports, was to ensure that all those adversely affected by a 
catastrophic oil spill could recover. Its causation standard, as evidenced 
by its “result from” and “due to” language and illuminating “incident” 
definition, is not the two-step proximate causation standard 
championed by the court, but rather a nexus standard that fulfills 
Congress’ intention to expand recovery beyond Robins and M/V 
TESTBANK. OPA was and remains driven by strong public policy. 
True public policy treats all claimants as equal. Inequitable application 
of OPA as is seen in Gatlin and the Moratorium claims flies in the face 
of such public policy and should not stand as precedent. 
This ruling is not simply about the Moratorium; it is about setting 
dangerous precedent in the Fifth Circuit that has the ability to create 
loopholes for responsible parties, narrow the recovery gap, and 
reinstate the Robins and M/V TESTBANK rule that Congress sought 
to supersede in enacting OPA. On August 10, 2016, the parties to the 
Moratorium case stipulated to the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s appeal.301 
As such, the court’s narrow interpretation of OPA and inadvertent 
inclusion of a two-step proximate causation standard is now precedent. 
The Fifth Circuit, situated in offshore oil country, is arguably faced 
with more significant OPA claims than much of the country. Precedent 
that reads the statute narrowly and inadvertently creates loopholes will 
only serve to harm an already economically disadvantaged region that 
suffers repeatedly from industry accidents. 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990). 
 301. Stipulated Agreement for Dismissal of Appeal, In re “Deepwater Horizon”, 168 F. Supp. 
3d 908 (E.D. La. 2016) (No. 513630893), appeal dismissed, No. 16-30245 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).  
